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ABSTRACT

Recent literature on gender stratification in the Japanese economy stresses structured
discrimination in worker recruitment and training policies as leading causes of depressed career
mobility among women. This paper maintains that the structural and institutional barrier
perspective alone is insufficient in understanding economic roles of women in Jap~. It
challenges a number of key assumptions of the structural and institutional barrier perspective that
places the excessive emphasis on individual independence through employment. Developed in
the U.S., this perspective tends to neglect larger social and cultural features of group oriented
societies. The examination of data in the postwar period in Japan indicates that working
conditions as measured by working hours and vacation days have remained harsh and that the
rapid economic growth has locked men in the narrow roles of worker-breadwinner. There is
little sign of convergence in terms of career orientations among men and women. This paper
also suggest difficulties in attributing women's lack of career orientations solely to perceived or
actual employment obstacles. The discussion section of the paper considers the nature of
network society as it relates to status-attainment processes. It suggests that the American
emphasis on individual attributes obscures social relations and one's group affiliations as critical
elements in which women's status and self-identify are embeded in Japan.

INTRODUCTION
In a doqumentary called "The Japanese Version," the film-makers introduce the audience
to a bar in Tokyo dedicated to American cowboy culture. Western memorabilia hangs on the
walls; country and ~estern music plays on the loudspeakers; and classic films are shown on
video monitors. Regular customers in the bar dress like a character out of a Hoot Gibson
movie. When asked why American Westerns are so popular in Japan, they answer that the
cowboy represents traditional Japanese society. Whenever there is trouble, the cowboys all
gather together into a group and take care of each other's interests, just like people in Japan.
In America, the cowboy is the quintessential individualist who solitarily roams the
prairies and lives by his own rules. Like The Lone Ranger, he rides into town, confronts evil,
and then rides off into the sunset.

If Japanese and Americans can see an image as clear as the American cowboy so
differently, it should come as no surprise that the idea of gender equality looks very different
in the two countries. It is a cliche to_ say that Japlli\ is a group-oriented society and America is
individualistic, but there is more than eno~gh truth in the stereotype to not reject it because of
the many exceptions that can be found. With gender equality issues, as with Westerns, what you
see depends on who you are.
Compared with advanced Western nations, Japan has been cited as a society reluctant in
achieving gender equality (O'Kelly and Carney, 1986). It is widely considered that the status
of women is significantly lower in Japan than in any other industrial nations. Recent efforts to
explain persistent gender inequality in the Japanese labor market emphasize barriers that are
structured in the employment institutions and duality of the economy. The structural/institutional
barrier perspective maintains that gender inequality results from discriminatory hiring, training,
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and promotion systems that are tied to Japan's dual economic structure (Brinton, 1989; 1993;
Kerbo, 1989; O'Kelly and Carney, 1986).
The structural/institutional barrier perspective is based on a number of American-centric
premises that have dubious application to Japanese society.

To provide a universalistic

explanation of the causes of gender stratification in the labor market, it tends to ignore larger
cultural and social institutional features of Japanese society. Japan is treated as just another
place to apply American models of employment and gender relations. When outcomes deviate
from the American ideal, employment structures are seen as irrational and "unfair." This is not
to say that Japanese economic structures are not discriminatory. It is, however, to question the
mechanical reliance on specific employment structures and institutions as the primary explanation
of gender inequality in the labor market. The application of universalist patterns excessively
narrows the conceptualization of female employment across cultures.
This paper argues that the structural/institutional barrier perspective alone is insufficient
to offer an explanation of gender stratification in the Japanese labor market. First, the paper
examines several key assumptions of structural/institutional barrier perspective as they apply to
gender stratification in the Japanese economy. Second, the paper shows that Japan's economic
changes during the 1970s and 1980s have tended to limit gender equality in the economy.
Examination of the impact of the dual economic structures that emerged since the mid-1970s
shows further strengthened gender stratification.

Finally, this paper examines whether the

structural/institutional barrier perspective alone can appropriately explain the observed gender
stratification that emerged in the last two decades in Japan. The examination of Japanese work
life and national attitudinal surveys suggests difficulties in attributing the observed
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"subordination" of Japanese women to narrowly defined structural and institutional barriers. In
the discussion section, this paper will consider why the individualistic career attainment model
restricts our understanding of gender equality in Japan.

Structural and Institutional Barrier Perspective on
Gender Stratification in Japan

By any conventional quantitative measures, Japan has a very poor showing with respect
to gender equality in the labor market. The overall pay differential remains 55 .5 (women) to
100 (men), as compared with 68 to 100 in the U.S.; the representation of females in managerial
ranks is extremely low (8.2 % in 1991) compared to any other industrially advanced nation (e.g.,
42 % for the U.S. in 1990 and 37% for Canada in 1989) (ILO, 1991).
During the past two decades, scholars analyzing the causes of gender stratification in the
U.S. developed a perspective that may be called the structural/institutional barrier perspective.
Although there are a wide array of causal locations in their views, they all emphasize structured
discrimination in recruitment and training policies as leading causes of depressed career mobility
and lower wages among women. 1

The employer prejudice view developed in the 1970s, for

example, suggests that employers are reluctant to hire women into full-time, employee positions
because they perceive women as less committed to work careers (Bergman, 1974; Blau and
Ferber, 1986; Carney and O'Kelly, 1987; Marini, 1989; Wolf and Fligstein, 1979). Also,

1

Before this perspective became popular, sociologists focused on the normative barrier
perspective. It attributed the causes of gender differences in occupational positions to gender
differences in socialization experiences.

5
corporations are reluctant to place women into high-status occupational positions that deviate
from the appropriate gender relationships. As a result, women tend to be 'trapped in' assistantlevel positions and have very little upper mobility and fewer wage increases. Institutionalized
discrimination in the hiring and promotion system causes the concentration of women in the
secondary labor market. 2 ·
A more recent structural/institutional barrier perspective (Brinton, 1989, 1993) suggests
Japanese employment institutions affect men and women differently as they are placed into
different job-tracks within a firm. In contrast to American hiring practices, large firms in Japan
hire high school and college graduates fresh out of school only once a year. A new graduate
has a once in a life-time chance of applying for a job at a large firm. When a man or woman
leaves a job from a large firm, the prospect of re-employment by a large firm is almost nonexistent in his or her life time. After entering a large firm, men are placed in 'career-tracks'
which are the key to moving up to managerial positions and they receive extensive in-house
training, seniority based wages and promotions, and permanent employment3.

Women are

2

A variant of this view is known as the statistical discrimination view (Aigner and Cain,
1977; Becker, 1971; Phelps, 1972; Rosenfeld, 1983). It suggests that employers perceive
women to have shorter job tenure and higher job tum-over rates than men do. Therefore,
employers place women in jobs that are least affected by worker tum over or in part-time jobs.
Neither type of job offers prospects for promotion.
3

Occupations at large firms and government agencies are extensively ranked (Pucik, 1984).
In the government sector, managerial recruits are classified into two categories: administrative
track Gimu-kei, literally, clerical track) and technical track (gijutsu-kei). Promotion to
managerial ranks is much higher for those on the administrative track. Since the passage of
Equal Employment Law in 1986, large firms started offering women options of choosing a
general clerical track, which handles assistant jobs, or an administrative career track (sogoshoku). In terms of distribution of workers in Japan, about 80 percent of males and 70·percent
of females are in the modem sector. The remaining population is located in the 'traditional'
sector, including agricultural workers, the self-employed, and family enterprise workers. Within
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typically hired as "office ladies", that is, they are placed on non-career tracks and are assigned
to assistant jobs that entail little responsibility and in-firm career mobility.

Because many

women resign from their jobs upon marriage or child-birth, their chances of getting re-employed
at large firms become severely limited. Consequently, they seek jobs in medium and small size
firms in the secondary labor market'. Having shorter job tenure and fewer skills by the time
they re-enter the labor market, these women receive low wages and limited opportunities for
promotion.

In short, these employment institutions preserve privileged positions for male

workers in large firms and keep female workers in small and medium firms where jobs are
unstable and wages are low. Thus, the structural/institutional barrier perspective views women
as victims of structural and institutional obstacles and calls for remedies such as equal
employment laws and affirmative action laws.

Shortcomings of Structural/Institutional Barrier Perspective

The structural/institutional barrier perspective is insufficient in explaining gender

the modem sector of the economy, about 11-15 percent of workers are employed by the public
sector. The remaining workers are located in the private sector, with approximately 13 percent
of these workers employed by large firms (Ministry of Labor, 1991).
4

The term, 'secondary labor market' stems from the labor market segmentation literature
(Ford, 1988: 140; Gordon, Edwards and Reich, 1983) that considers the nature and impact of
economic structures on workers. Briefly speaking, this perspective suggests that the private
economy is divided into two sectors: the core (or primary) and the secondary (or periphery).
The core sector consists of the large firms with stable employment, opportunities for internal
mobility, and high wages for workers. The secondary sector consists of small and medium size
firms with marginal profits, labor intensive work, low capital input, and intense competition for
survival. The jobs tend to be unstable and wages are low. Traditionally, women, minorities,
and immigrants· find themselves in this sector of the economy.
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stratification in the Japanese labor market because of a number of American-centric premises
that have limited application to Japan. First, it presumes that· career mobility challenges the
individual to fulfill human potential and interests, where the higher the occupational status one
achieves, the more rewards accrue to the individual. This assumption, however, must be put
into a proper societal context to be evaluated. Although it depicts high-status careers in large
firms as glamorous and prestigious, it rarely mentions modest monetary rewards systems in
Japan and high personal costs associated with high-status career attainment.

Presumably

glamorous, high-status, corporate executives do not earn big salaries in Japan as they do in the
U.S. In 1984 the average salaries of top executives in Japan ranged from $50,000 to $250,000.
Income gap between the top executive class and the entry-level employee class was 7: 1 in Japan
as compared to 37: 1 in the U.S. The average male employee at his peak earnings, at around
age 45-49, makes only twice as large an income as the entry-level employees do (at age 20-24)
(Kerbo, 1989: 431).

In addition to a modest monetary incentive system, one cannot

overemphasize the harshness of working conditions in Japan. Presumably, secure career-track
employment is tied to a long-term commitment to a firm where rules of seniority, rather than
the rules of meritocracy, dictate promotion and salary increase. An individual must not only
wait a long time for substantial salary increase, but has little flexibility and control over personal
career development, working hours, and leisure time. As we shall see later in this paper, the
comparison of Japanese national average labor time with that of other major countries illustrates
the magnitude of Japanese deviance.
Second, the structural/institutional barrier perspective on gender stratification considers
career achievements exclusively in· modem paid occupations. It excludes other models of career
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attainment, such as entrepreneurs who are classified as self-employed workers. The exclusion
of this 'traditional' sector poses some problems for Japan, since Japan is a country of small-scale
businesses and there are many owners-managers of family business enterprises. 5 In 1986, small
businesses with less than 50 workers absorbed 64 percent of the workers in the private sector.
Companies with more than 300 employees accounted for only 13 percent of workers. Thirteen
(13) percent of the total labor force, or 10% of the female labor force, were business owners
(Ministry of Labor, 1991). In the West, by contrast, the development of capitalism involved
the rise of large-scale organizations and contraction of small-scale businesses. Only a small
percentage of female workers are so called self-employed (U.S., 6%; Denmark, 3%; Sweden,
5%) (ILO, 1991). The examination of career pursuits confined to modern occupations not only
narrows the conceptualization of female employment in Japan. It also underestimates actual
female representation in business management and administration. 6
Third, the structural/institutional approach takes the growing independence of women and
their involvement in. occupational careers as given and presumes men and women have similar
aspirations for career pursuits.

However, the increasing levels of women's work career

aspirations and the corresponding convergence·of men and women's life course patterns in the

5

These workers (the self-employed persons and family workers) are classified as those in
the 'traditional' sector. It is almost excluded, as if this is a backward, anachronistic, and
marginal category of work and workers.
6

One may argue that the ownership of small business does not offer as much financial
security and attractive working conditions as does large business. Nevertheless, it needs to be
considered in the overall employment structures. As mentioned in the text, companies with less
than 50 workers account for nearly two-thirds of the Japanese labor force in the private sector.
Being a boss of one's own company offers challenges and remains an attractive career goal for
workers in small and medium scale companies (Ballon, 1989: 11).
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U.S. are partly a reflection of decreased stability in the work place and the family. Recent
macro-level, social and economic changes (e.g., high unemployment and divorce rates, the
erosion of the family wage system) have contributed to growing ambivalence with regard to the
meaning of the family and decreasing functional payoffs of traditional family career pursuits for
women (Buchmann, 1989; Ehrenreich, 1983). Thus, the growing independence of women and
their involvement in occupational careers are also the consequence of women's greater needs to
rely on their own resources as much as women's preference for career attainment based on new
work and family models. These structural transformations that weakened the linkage between
work and the family, however, have not occurred with the same magnitude in Japanese society.
The structural and cultural basis linking the work and family life remains relatively stable, and
this stability still assures the functional payoffs in the sex division of work and family careers. 7
Finally, the structural/institutional approach is built on the assumption that men and
women have similar career orientations. In the U.S., empirical research in the 1980s lent
support to this assumption. Today, there are more similarities than differences in occupational
aspirations of American men and women including career pursuits in high-status occupations
(Fiorentine, 1988; Jacobs, 1989; Buchmann, 1989).

Thus, men and women with similar

educational qualifications and career aspirations should have the same probabilities of
occupational achievements. However, this chain of assumptions may not hold for Japan where
men and women tend to report dissimilar career orientations and pursue different life course

7

The divorce rate in Japan is on the rise but is still the lowest among industrially advanced
countries. In 1983 the divorce rate was 1.51 per 1,000 population in Japan, as compared to 5.0
per 1,000 in the U.S. (United Nations, 1983, pp. 517-519). More recent data for Japan show
that the divorce rate decreased somewhat (1.26 per 1,000 in 1990) (Bando, 1992: 14).
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patterns. Research indicates that most Japanese women conceive of marriage and family as the
major institutional domain of their adulthood identities and pursue work careers to fit in with
their family careers (Imamura, 1987; Lebra, 1984; Lebra, Paulson, and Powers, 1976; Plath,
1983). Even among the college educated, there are considerable differences in career ambitions
between men and women. As we shall see later in: this paper, the proportion of women who are
!

fundamentally oriented to the pursuit of occupational success is still small and has not increased

I
much during the past three decades.

8

Women in the Labor Force in the U.S. and Japan, 1960-1990
f

I

'

When one considers the overall labor for~e participation rates among women, Japan and
i

pr the female adult population is working.
I

the U.S. are quite similar. Approximately half

In

i

1990 the rates were 58% for the U.S. and 50% for Japan (Table 1). However, as data in Table
I
I

1 show, these two countries are characterized· by !diverse historical patterns in their female labor
force participation.

Contrary to the popular i image of Japanese housewives who devote
'

themselves to the family, Japanese women have:worked in large numbers, at about 50 percent
I

in the last three decades. Female labor participation rates in Japan have been relatively high and
I
I

have shown very little change over time. In contrast, the overall trend for American women has
involved a sharp increase in labor force participation rates, from 38 percent in 1960 to 58
I

percent in 1990.

8

The American pattern is rriarked by the recency of female labor force
I

Scholars with the structural/instititional barrier perspective maintain that a lack of career
aspirations among Japanese women is a result of gender-differenciated socialization or perceived
or actual lack of career opportunity for women. These views are well taken. In the discussion
section, I consider problems associated with these socialization perspectives.
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participation, whereas the Japanese pattern reveals a relative continuity in female labor force
participation in the post WW II economy. The notion that recent economic and social changes
have brought about increases in female labor force participation well describes the American
experience but not the Japanese.
A somewhat similar pattern of U.S.-Japan differences exists in terms of female labor
force participation by marital status. As data in Table 2 show, labor force participation among
single women in the U.S. rose from 59 percent in 1960 to 68 percent in 1990. A much more
dramatic increase, however, took place among married women, with their labor force
participation rising from 32 percent in 1960 to 58 percent in 1990. In Japan, in contrast,
participation rates among married women have been relatively high, at about 50 percent in the
last three decades. Thus, during the past 30 years the comparison of married women between
the two countries indicates an overall higher rate of labor force participation among Japanese
married women. Again, Japan shows stable, high levels of labor force participation with only
a slight increase, while the U.S. experienced a sharp increase in participation during the past
three decades.

Labor Force Participation and the Effects of Life Cycle

Although the above examination of historical trends in female labor force participation
by marital status indicates a relatively stable, high level of labor force participation among
Japanese married women, there are stronger effects of family of procreation (or life cycle
effects) among Japanese women than among American women. As Figures 1 and 2 which
describe female labor force participation by age group in the last three decades indicate, Japan
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forms an upper case letter "M" or "double-humped" line due to withdrawal from the labor force
in the prime childbearing period and re-entry into the labor market in middle age. In contrast,
. in the U.S., there has been a drastic increase in the labor force participation among married
women after 1970. Among women aged 34 to 44, labor force participation rates nearly doubled,
from 40 percent in 1960 to nearly 80 percent in 1989. For women aged 25 to 34, similarly,
labor force participation rates increased from 37 percent to 72 percent in the same period. By
1989, there is no perceptable indication of life-cycle effects on women's labor force participation
patterns among American women. By contrast, Japanese patterns have shown consistent and
persistent life cycle effects on women's economic activities.
In considering the magnitude of changes American women made in the pursuit of careers
in the last twenty years, it is striking that in Japan the temporary withdrawal from the labor
force during the prime childbearing years has remained as strong over time. Despite sweeping
economic changes that Japan has undergone in the last three decades and despite much publicized
increases in so-called "career minded" women who intend to pursue their careers without any
interruptions, a large proportion of Japanese female workers withdraw from the labor force
during the prime childbearing years and re-enter the labor market in early middle age. It is
remarkable that there has been relatively little change in these M-curve patterns of female
employment over time. But it is not clear what these persistent patterns mean and how they are
maintained. Some argue that these M-curve patterns support the view that Japanese women still
conceive of family careers as their central adulthood roles and work careers of secondary
importance (U.S. Department of Education, 1987).
questions.

The following section considers these
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Economic Rationalization of the 1970s
and the Creation of Part-Time Jobs

Recent studies stressing the effects of structural/institutional barriers (e.g., firm-specific
employment practices) suggest that once Japanese women leave their jobs, their chances of
getting re-employed in the core sector of the labor market (i.e., large firms) becomes severely
limited. Once leaving the initial jobs, they are forced into the acceptance of jobs at medium and
small firms in the secondary market.

The examination of changes in the structure of the

Japanese economy during the 1970s and 1980s does show that Japan's phenomenal economic
growth has tended to limit, rather than to enhance, their full participation to the economy.
The Japanese economy was radically transformed as it was hard hit by oil shocks twice
in the 1970s. Observers note that many Japanese companies coped with these adverse economic
conditions by creating subcontracting relationships and a temporary, part-time work force.
Ballon (1989), for example, suggests that subcontracting relationships have evolved as highly
competitive technologically flexible strategies among large corporations. Also, large firms have
transferred redundant workers to their subsidiaries and affiliates in order to keep the enterprise
lean. Although one might expect the gradual weakening of, and even the disappearance of,
small enterprises in the modern society, in Japan, small establishments have not bee~ absorbed
by large firms. They have remained strong in the overall economy. Ballon (1989: 3) estimates
that small-scale manufacturing enterprises employing less than 20 workers constitute about 80
percent of all the manufacturing firms that were created since mid-1970 and remain at that level
today.
Many Japanese firms also attempted to rationalize the labor force by increasingly shifting
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towards part-time workers. By keeping a limited number of permanent workers to whom the
company is obligated to respect life-time employment, full benefits, and competitive wages, the
hiring of temporary, part-time workers gave companies more flexibility in terms of wages, hours
of work, and the terms of contract9 • As we see in the following section, women, especially
married women, were increasingly drawn into the secondary sectors of the modem economy.
Table 3 breaks down labor force participation among Japanese women by forms of
employment over time. In the post-World War II Japanese economy, a large percentage of
Japanese women worked as "family enterprise workers."

In 1955 half of female workers

(50. 6 %) supplied labor as family enterprise workers. Many of these women were in agricultural
industries, since the agricultural sector absorbed 43 percent of total female labor force in 1960.
These female "family enterprise workers" represented the largest component of the female labor
force until about 1960. By 1990, however, family enterprise workers accounted for only 17
percent of the total female labor force.

The contraction of agriculture and other traditional

industries paralleled the growth of modem forms of employment, as evidenced by the sharp
increase of female workers in the "employee" category, from 34 percent to 72 percent between
1955-1990. Yet, further breakdown of the "employee" category in Table 3 shows that the
contraction of "family enterprise workers" was accompanied by a sharp increase in female parttime workers after 1970. Part-time workers constituted only 5 percent of the total female labor
force in 1970 but by 1990 it increased to almost 20 percent.

9

By contrast, female family

It should be noted that part-time work does not necessary mean short hours of work.
Accoding to a national survey of 30,000 part-time workers conducted in 1990, on the average,
married women (who made up 80 percent of all the respondents) worked 5.9 hours a day for
five days with the average daily comuting time of 20 minutes (Special Committee of the Minister
of Labor, 1991).
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enterprise workers went down from 31 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in 1990. In the same
period, the increase in full-time employment among Japanese females was modest, from 48
percent in 1970 to 53 percent in 1990.
The above findings that Japan experienced a modest growth in female full-time positions
but a greater increase in part-time positions is consistent with the literature that Japan's economic
success has involved the intensification of the duality in its economy in the mid-70s. By creating
small firms and a temporary, part-time labor force, companies attempted to rationalize the
production processes. There is clear evidence that Japan's rapid economic growth of the 1970s
and 1980s has not translated to the full incorporation of female workers into the core sector of
the economy where workers are assured of stable employment, better wages, and career
opportunities; but has been partly achieved by dual economic structuring. Table 4 provides
further evidence that women have been increasingly pulled into the secondary labor market as
part-time workers. Data comparing women's employment forms by age group between 1982
and 1987 show that for all age groups considered, there has been a decline in full-time
employment ("employees") but a sharp increase in the proportion of women working as part-time
or temporary workers. Among women aged 35-54, part-time employment reached the highest
level, accounting for 43 percent of female workers in that age group in 1987.
The above observation demonstrates that there has been a considerable degree of
continuity and change in Japanese women's employment patterns. On the one hand, women
have experienced stable, relatively high levels of labor force participation in the last three
decades. On the other hand, women were increasingly relegated to secondary labor market jobs
during the time when Japan achieved robust economic growth. It describes the unchanging
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nature of gender stratification in the Japanese economy.
The observed unequal representation of men and women in the Japanese labor market,
however, may or may riot be the direct result of blocked opportunities or discrimination. One
cannot deduce the effects of assumed causes by the observed outcome without eliminating other
possible causes, such as career ambitions of the individuals. If men and women have different
career choices and do not pursue similar careers, the resultant differences, as reflected in the
uneven representation of men and women in certain careers, has little to do with the blocked
opportunities or institutionalized discrimination in the economy.
In the U.S., there has been a growing independence of women and their involvement in
occupational careers, leading to increasing convergence of men and women's life course
patterns. However, one cannot mechanically apply the American model of life course patterns
disregarding the linkages among cultural, social, and economic institutions. High levels of
unemployment, divorce, and the erosion of the family wage system since the 1970s, in
particular, have made the traditional family system obsolete. Today, American women have
greater needs to rely on their own resources. In Japan, in contrast, economic prosperity of the
1960s and 1970s in Japan gave rise to the notion of 'traditional' family unit and ideology of fulltime housewife (Lebra, 1986).
The following section examines a number of national attitudinal data and data on work
conditions during the past two decades in Japan. It shows a considerable degree of continuity
in the ways in which women conduct their life course careers. It also shows that Japan's
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economic prosperity, which depended heavily on the dedicated work force and the rigid
employment institutions, tended to constrain men's life course patterns to a far greater degree
than it did for women.

Japan's Economic Growth and Harsh Labor Conditions:
Men chained in the Roles of Breadwinner

As Japan joined the ranks of economic superpowers in the 1980s, it was the Japanese
management, corporate structures, and dual economic structuring that received most scholarly
attention. Men were depicted as free to pursue power and venture outside the home, leaving
family matters to their wives. Women were seen as chained to family roles and marginal roles
in the labor market. However, issues relating to male work conditions during the past two
decades have not been fully incorporated in the literature of gender stratification in Japan.
Although scholars differ in their degree of emphasis, there is agreement that the Japanese
employment institutions of long--term job security and seniority were critical in achieving postwar economic prosperity. 10 These institutions, however, have locked Japanese men into a rigid

10

As mentioned, not all Japanese workers are provided with life-time employment.
Although ~stimates vary, workers with life-time job security accounts for 20-25 percent of the
labor force (i.e., public sector plus those working for large firms). Levin (1983), for example,
suggests that workers with life-long careers accounted for about 20 percent during 1960s and.
1970s. Given the heavy concentration of small and medium size firms in Japan, job mobility
rates (or career change) from medium size firms to small-scale firms or to become ownermanagers of small firms are higher than one might expect. According to Cole (1979) who
compared labor mobility among auto workers between the U.S. and Japan in the mid-1970s, 35
percent of male workers in Japan stayed with the first employer, as compared with 13 percent
of males in the U.S. Cheng (1991), based on 1,800 males workers aged 20-69 in 1975, arrives
at similar figures. Cheng's study also confirms that workers in large firms and workers on
managerial tracks have the lowest rates of job-leaving. Production and sales workers tend to
have high rates of mobility, reflecting the existence of smaller-scale manufacuring and retail
businesses in Japan. According to Levin (1983) and Cole (1979), overall job mobility rates in

18
system of career attainment. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese employment system demands
considerable worker dedication to the company. Worker's careers are shaped and re-shaped
depending on the company's goals, allowing little worker's automony over his career
development. In addition, workers are dispatched from one geographical location to another,
depending on the company's needs. These company assignments often lead to family separation,
known as 'tan-shinfunin' in Japan. 11 Also, rules of seniority rather than worker merit dictate
promotions and wage increases. This dedication to the company is also a factor in limiting
men's familial role to that of bread-winner.

Also, the Japanese employment system,

· characterized by its in-house training, fosters the acquisition of firm specific skills that are not
easily transferable to other companies. Movement to another firm would mean loss of seniority
and a drastic reduction in income. All these factors contribute to men's company centered life.
During the 1980s, problems caused by the over-commitment of male workers to their
companies, as well as the costs associated with it, caught media and scholarly attention. The
first sign was the rising divorce rate among the mature couples whose marriage exceeded more

Japan are quite comparable to those found in Europe and that it is the job mobility rates in the
U.S. that are higher than the international standards. Since this paper addresses male career
attainment in high-status occupations, the notion of long-term employment and constraints that
come with it still apply.
11

Tan-shinfunin refers to a form of job-related geographical relocation of a spouse. When
assigned to a new post, a married male worker is often obliged to move to another city by
himself, leaving the wife and children behind. Most of tan-shin funin cases occur due .to
children's education. In 1985 there were 200,000 married men in Japan who were classified as
'tanshin funin.' More than half of these men were 40-49 years of age (Special Committee to
the Minister of Labor, 1992). Also, the author's pilot study conducted in Japan in 1993 suggests
that by age 50, Japanese male employees of large companies (with more than 1,000 workers)
have typically been dispached at least three times, requiring geographical re-location. In most
cases, each assingnment lasted three to five years.
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than 15 to 20 years, with divorce usually initiated by the wives. The second was the difficulties
men experience after they retire. Because men have lived a single minded pursuit of work
careers and have neglected wives and children for so many years, by the time they retire, they
have a much smaller range of hobbies and cultural/leisure interests than do women. They have
very little usefulness around the house, as they are increasingly labelled as "sodai gomi"
(oversized garbage) or "nure ochiba" (wet leaves). Another sign was recent news of deaths from
over-work among male workers and recent incidents of worker layoffs which caused harsh media
criticisms and public outcry. Hard working men, known as 'corporate warriors/fighters' during
the 1970s but now known as 'company livestock' (sha-chiku, literally labor animals kept by
companies) in the 1990s, are beginning to question the very meaning of their lives for the first
time. 12
Several measures of work conditions indicate the degree of harshness of the work place
in Japan. The examination of labor time, .shown in Table 5, indicate that in 1989 Japanese
average annual working hours were 2,159 hours as compared with 1,989 for the U.K., 1,957
for the U.S., 1,646 for France, and 1,638 for Germany. 13 These lengthy working hours for
Japanese do not include long hours of daily commute, frequent overtime work, and other jobrelated duties (e.g., business meetings at night, business entertainment, evening socializing with

12

Starting 1990, Japan entered a new era, known as the bubble burst following the sharp
increases in asset prices in the 1980s. Economists maintain that the impact of current economic
recession is qualitatively different from the previous major recessions (i.e., the recession caused
by the oil shock in the 1970s and the recession caused by the rising yen in the mid 1980s). This
time, white collar workers are most affected by the recession (Usui, 1993).
'
13

The figures given in Table 5 are average labor time of all workers, including men and
women. Actual working hours for men would be longer.
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co-workers, and weekend golfing). Further, Japanese workers reported a total of 120 holidays
in 1991 as compared with 147 days for British, 139 days for Americans, and 157 days for
Germans. It also shows that Japanese took only 9 paid-vacation days in a year, while Americans
took about twice that, with 19 days, and Germans and French, almost three times as many
vacation days, with 29 and 26 days, respectively. Figures given in the bottom row of Table 5
indicate that Japanese and Americans missed their work only 3 and 6 days, respectively, in
1989, while Germans missed the most with 16 days, and French and British both missed 11
days. These data confirm the well-publicized notion that Japanese work long hours, many more
days, and have very little time for leisure. It is not surprising to learn that most workers in
Japan use their weekend just to "rest" at home rather than pursuing leisure activities.
Turning our attention from the international comparison to the examination of working
conditions in Japan over time, data in Table 6 show that there has been little reduction in
working hours since 1975. ·In 1975, the average length of working hours per worker was 175
hours, a considerable decrease from 182 hours in 1970. But it remained at that level throughout
the 1980s. In the meantime, the differences between large firms (with more than 500 workers)
I

and medium firms (with 30 to 99 workers) shrank somewhat over the years, from 7 hour in
1970 to 4 hours in 1989. Still, compared with the national average of 174 hours per worker per
month, 182 hours of average labor time among medium firms is considerably long.
Although not well publicized in the U.S., the institution of two-day weekend holidays is
a relatively recent phenomenon in Japan. As of 1992, only 14.5 percent of all companies in
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Japan has instituted such a policy. 14 Another 33 percent of the enterprises surveyed had biweekly, two-day weekend holidays.

While the introduction of two-day weekend holidays

undoubtedly increased leisure time for Japanese workers, there are also indications that, to make
up the lost time, companies are instituting so called "service over-time" to their employees,
meaning employees put in over-time work without compensation (Usui, 1993).
A recent survey conducted by the Ministry of Labor based on 1,573 full-time employees
aged 30 to 54 illuminates the problems workers encounter at work when taking a vacation to
which they are entitled. 15 The survey found that only 8 percent of the male employees took
all the paid-vacation days in the previous year. Another. 18 percent took 50-80 percent of
vacation days and one-third (32 %) took 20-40 percent of their paid vacation time. By far the
largest category of men, 41 percent, did not take any paid-vacation time at all because "there
is too much work to do" and "there is no one who could cover my position while I am gone. "16
Female employees took paid-vacation time a lot more than men did. Fifteen percent
(15%) of females took all the paid vacation days, and another 31 percent took 50-80 percent of
the vacation time. Twenty eight percent (28 %) of female employees took 20-40 percent of

14

School children still go to school six days a week, five full week days and half a day on
Saturdays. In 1992 public schools instituted a two-day weekend once a month, mostly taken on
the third week of the month.
15

A national survey conducted by the Ministry of Labor in 1991 based on random sampling
of 1,000 companies employing more than 30 workers.
16

Due to rounding, figures do not add up to 100 percent. As mentioned earlier, the
Japanese employment system tends to keep a limited number of full-time employees to whom
companies are expected to honor long-term job security. Because the number of workers in such
positions is kept small, overtime work is used very commonly during economic growth. During
economic recessions, companies resort to overtime reduction first (Usui, 1993). Understaffing
makes it difficult for workers to take sick leaves or vacations.
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vacation, while 24 percent did not take any paid vacation at all. 17 By far the most common
reasons for not having taken paid-vacation time involved such responses as "there is no one who
could cover my position while I am gone" and "it is difficult to take paid-vacation time when
your superiors don't take it." In addition, the survey reveals that those with a high education
level and managerial responsibilities took paid-vacation least (Ministry of Labor, 1992).
Confirming the national pattern shown in Tables 5 and 6, the same Ministry of Labor's
survey also shows that these full-time employees do overtime work regularly. It also indicates
that women have over-time work much less frequently than men do. Almost half of the male
employees (48%) had over-time work on a daily basis and another 32 percent of workers had
over-time work every other day. Less than 20 percent of men reported having no or almost no
overtime work.

In contrast, a much smaller percentage of female employees, 16 percent,

reported having over time work on a daily basis, and another 17 percent did over-time work
every other day. Almost half of the female employees (48 %) reported having no over-time work
or almost no over time work. 18
In sum, the assumpt10n that high-status careers are glamorous and desirable, while lowstatus occupations are not, is quite misleading. Work in Japan remains much harsher than other
advanced countries. Compared with male counterparts, female employees are freer from workrelated constraints because of their lower status positions. Recent reports concerning a large
number of women who left the managerial-track positions at large corporations indicate the harsh

17

18

The remaining 2 percent of female respondents did not give answeres.

The remaining 12 percent of men and 18 percent of women had over-time work during
certain times of the year.
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working conditions and high personal costs associated with 'corporate samurai' careers as the
major reason for their resignation (Shitamori, 1992). The data just examined here suggest that
it is not just structured discrimination but also harsh working conditions that depress women's
career attainment in Japan. Next section examines whether it is structured discrimination or
these poor working conditions that discourage women and lead them to seek family careers.

Women's Life Course Patterns

Recent changes in Japan have undoubtedly increased the tendency toward individualism,
however, there has been a steady support in the gender division of work and family in Japan.
A large proportion of Japanese, including young women, view home and family responsibilities
as their primary careers anq conceive of the temporary withdrawal from the labor force followed
by the later re-entry into the market as the most desirable life-course patterns.
National surveys conducted by the Japanese,Prime Minister's Office during the last thirty
years, for example, indicate that when asked, "What is the most preferred employment patterns
for women?", the percentage of respondents favoring a temporary withdrawal during the
childbearing years has increased in the last thirty years.

As data in Table 7 show, the

percentage of women favoring such a life course pattern changed from 39.5 percent in 1972, to
55.2 percent in 1983, and 64.2 percent in 1990. This sharp increase is primarily due to the
declining support for a complete withdrawal from the labor force upon marriage or first child
birth. Response favoring a complete withdrawal decreased from 30.9 percent in 1972, to 19.5
percent in 1983 and 14.2 percent in 1990. Ideas for women's pursuit of work careers without
any disruptions show a modest overall increase, with 11.5 percent in 1972, 16.6 percent in
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1983, and 14.4 percent in 1990.
Data in the bottom half of Table 7 examine working women's attitudes towards family
and work careers by different age groups based on a national sample of 3,072 working women
conducted by the Japan Institute of Labor in 1992. While overall response patterns shown at
the very bottom of the table fairly closely correspond to those reported by the national sample
of women (working and not-working) in 1990, there are some notable differences. First, more
than half of working women of all age groups support the 'temporary withdrawal followed by
a re-entry' pattern. The only exception to this rule is working women aged 30-34. Among this
age group of working women, the view that women should continue work careers without
causing disruptions is high, with more than one in three women of this age bracket expressing
such a view.

The sharp increase in women's interests for the continuous pursuit of work

careers, beginning with age group 25-29 and reaching the peak among women aged 30-34, may
indicate the effects of "weeding out", since Figure 2 indicates that women in this age bracket
(age 30~34) have the lowest rate of labor force participation among all women aged 20-55. In
other words, working women aged 30-34 tend to be those more committed to their work careers.
Conversely, the same result may indicate the reflective response patterns among middle aged
women who found their re-entry to the labor force after taking a temporary leave was more
costly than they expected. Given the bitter experience they had, they may support continuous
· work patterns more than temporary withdrawal followed by the later re-entry pattern.s.
Second, data concerning women's attitudes toward work and family careers among
working women indicate that young women, age 16-19 and 20-24, show a wide distribution of
preferences. This wide spread in their responses indicates the presence of diverse clusters of
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career orientations among young women in Japan. While some young working women are
strongly bent toward the pursuit of work careers, the large majority seek more family-oriented
careers. 19
Lastly, the data do not support the view that young women, as compared with older
women, have a more work-career centered orientation. The comparison of responses between
young women (age 16-19 and 20-24) and more mature women (age 45-49 and 50-54), for
example, suggests that the idea for 'complete withdrawal upon marriage or child birth' is much
stronger among the younger age groups, not among the older ones. Further, mature age groups
are no less supportive of women's occupational achievement than are the young age groups. The
comparison of women, age 20-24 and age 50-54, for example, shows that an identical proportion
of respondents in each group, 13 percent, endorses women's pursuit of work careers without any
disruptions. As examined earlier, women in Japan have had a high, steady rate of labor force
participation in the last forty years. Thus, there is no reason to expect today's mature working

19

Obviously, these- <l.ggregate data obscure variation in career orientations among women
with different educational levels. In 1992 four-year college enrollments were 17 percent for
women and 35 percent for men. Differences in career goals between college educated men and
women remain still strong. According to a recent survey (Araki, 1990) of 1,019 women (aged
18-25) who. were just hired by one of the large firms in Tokyo upon graduation from high school
and college, 12 percent of female employees, as opposed to 54 percent of male employees, had
long-term career plans at the firm. Twenty four percent (24 %) of females and 34 percent of
males were intent on moving elsewhere or becoming independent in the future. Thirty-six
percent (36%) of females planned to quit upon marriage. No male respondents had such an
anwer. Twenty percent (20%) of females but only 6 percent of males did not have any future
career plans. Among the four-year college graduates, the distribution for those having a long
term career plan at the present firm was 13 percent for females and 34 percent for males.
Thirty four percent (34%) of females and males each wanted either to move to other jobs or
become independent in the future. Nineteen percent (19 %) of women intended to quit working
upon marriage. Twenty seven percent (27 %) of females and 3 percent of males did not have
any future career plans.
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women to be more 'traditional' (i.e., more family centered) than today's working young. Data
even support the opposite interpretation that traditional life-course patterns are more· prevalent
among today's young cohort than the older ones.

Advantage of Part-time Work?

As we noted earlier, married women constitute 67 percent of total female labor force in
Japan. They also account for 79 percent of part-time workers. Socio-psychological surveys
taken in the last twenty years consistently show that married women who are re-entering the
labor market often prefer part-time jobs to full-time jobs because they offer convenient time
schedules and location. A small proportion of married women with part-time jobs opted for
part-time work because of the unavailability of jobs that offered personal fulfillment or because
of the unavailability of full,.time, employee positions.
According to the Japanese Prime Minister's Office (1983: 125), for example, when the
survey asked, "What is the most critical factor for you to consider when re-entering the job

market after childbearing period?" (multiple answer question), the overwhelming majority of the
respondents, 82 percent of women, replied it was most important "to be able to work without
sacrificing family careers". In contrast, women with work career oriented responses, such as
"to find the type of jobs one can use one's skills, ability, and creativity, was a more modest, 23
percent. Only 19 percent of women considered "good pay" as. an important consideration in
resuming work. Data in Table 8 summarizing the major reasons for choosing part-time work,
as opposed to full-time employee positions, among various age ·groups of female part-time
workers also yield similar results. Among all age groups, the most often mentioned response
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was the 'convenient working hours' that part-time jobs offer, with more than 60 percent of
women aged 20-54 citing such a reason. In general, the next most prevalent reason was also
related to convenience, that is, a preference for short working hours/days. Compared to the
earlier observation on lengthy working hours and little vacation time associated with the regular,
full-time career pursuits, it is the flexibility and convenience that make part-time jobs attractive.
Among women of child bearing age, 25-39, "having family responsibilities" was the second most
important reason for choosing part-time jobs. In contrast, those who settled for part-time jobs
because full-time positions were not available were quite low in general. It is the older women
aged 50 and over who tended to mention such involuntary choice.
Another survey conducted by the Ministry of Labor in 1979 and 1991 (Table 9)
examining attitudes among women with part-time jobs reports that the degree of dissatisfaction
with part-time jobs is not high and that the large majority of women wish to continue part-time
jobs. In 1979 when the question asked, "If you are given the opportunity of taking a full-time,
employee position, would you like to switch to it?", 78 percent of female part-time workers
declined such a hypothetical offer.

The majority of these women, 64 percent; gave

'inconvenience' created by the full-time employment position as the reason for not wanting a
full-time position. In 1991, when the survey asked the question, "What type of employment
would you like to get in the future?", 57 percent of female part-time workers expressed no
interests in changing their employment behav1ors.

About 14 percent of women expressed

interests in moving onto more challenging work or more professional, technical, or managerial
jobs. Given differences in questions asked, these results taken in 1979 and 1991 are not strictly
comparable; however, the patterns of response are rather consistent. There is no indication that
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female part-time workers are forced into taking "undesirable" jobs; on the contrary, the picture
that emerges from these surveys is that women are making conscious decisions about their family
and work careers, however undesirable their jobs may seem. Data examined here show that it
is not just the perceived or actual lack of employment opportunities that drive women into the
pursuit of family careers.

DISCUSSION

It would be a gross misunderstanding to say that the structural/institutional barrier
perspective does not explain the persistent gender inequality in the Japanese labor market. There
is abundant evidence of sex discrimination that keeps women confined to the marginal roles in
Japan's dual economy. I have challenged, however, a number of assumptions that limit our
understanding of gender differences in the Japanese labor market. The uneven distribution of
men and women in a given occupation does not necessarily confirm discriminatory employment
practices, especially when men and women do not pursue similar occupations.

The data

examined in this paper show that Japanese men and women have different career orientations.
Further, the examination of part-time workers, presumably the victims of discrimination under
the structural/institutional barrier perspective, do not show signs of victimization.
Of course, one may argue that the existing gender differences in career orientations is
a result of perceived or actual lack of career development opportunity for Japanese women.
Gender differentiated socialization and education lead men and women to acquire and to develop
career patterns that are normatively gender appropriate.

It contends that women generally

emphasize family careers over work careers either because they anticipate social rejection or
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because they come to believe that the pursuit of both family and occupational careers would not
be possible.
Such socio-psychological perspectives has considerable utilities in explaining the lack of
career attainment among women in Japan.

However, both the socio-psychological and

structural/institutional perspectives assume that occupational attainment is the only route to
achieving gender equality.

They conceive of gender differentiated socialization and role

specialization inherently unequal. Boys and girls should be treated equally and brought up to
pursue similar occupational goals. Such models of female career attainment present problems
when applied to Japan.
First, gender equality often implies women's convergence to male standards. Some
interpreted the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law in 1986 indicating women
want to be like men and eliminated 'protections; accorded to women in the work place. It also
imposed the male work standards on women. Women are now required to work just as hard and
long as men do in order to be treated equally. This change was hardly an improvement for the
status of women.
Second, the American model of gender equality emphasizes individual personhood, rather
than gender. It equates differences with inequality. What seems like gender inequalities to
Americans may not be inequality but differences to Japanese. Gender differences need not be
gender inequality. American families today believe that they should bring up their children to
become competent individuals regardless of sex. Japanese, however, do not. They believe that
boys and girls have different characters, not necessarily unequal, that are best realized in
different patterns of life. To raise children regardless of gender traits would be unthinkable and
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Japanese do not endorse such views.
Third, and most important, status attainment processes are quite different in the two
countries. In the U.S., status production (e.g., occupational attainment) is a must for achieving
one's social status. In Japan, one is expected to fit into various statuses and fulfill duties within.
a particular group. To use an example of a housewife, being a housewife in the U.S. does not
·give a clear social status to women. Although few Americans would argue that raising children
is an important occupation, it has nevertheless lost most of the status it once carried. Women
who stay home are often viewed as dependent as opposed to the independent ideal. Being a
housewife in Japan, however, does give her a clear social status.
American society is founded on individualism, one looking out for oneself. "Every man
for himself." "It's a dog eat dog world." In such a society, the construction of individual self
is directly linked with individual status production.

The assurance of individual rights and

opportunities become the rules of playing the fair game of status attainment for all.
In contrast, Japanese society is a society of interlocking relationships, often called a
network society. In such a society, it is not individual needs that take precedent but mutual
consideration of others' needs.

"I take care of your needs; you take care of mine." One's

identity is embedded in social interactions which are hierarchically ordered. The construction
of oneself is achieved by taking and fulfilling statuses, roles, and responsibilities one occupies
in a given social network. The little guy should respect the big guy, but the big guy should take
care of the little guy. Individual social responsibilities are valued as highly as, or more than,
the individual rights. An individual's social self is achieved by taking roles in relation to one's
groups (the family, company, community).
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Linguists and anthropologists offer critical differences that exist between a statusachieving society (e.g., U.S.) and a rnle society (e.g., Japan). Japanese who come into contact
with other Japanese cannot interact, even sit down at a table, unless their status is clearly defined
in the context of social relationships. When identifying oneself, Japanese will say, "ABC kaisha
no Nakao desu."

An American will say, "This is Jim Metzger from ABC company." In

addition, Americans provide their given name first, but for Japanese, family name comes first.
Once the status-relevant characteristics, such as age, sex, education, company, and occupational
title have been identified and relative ranking known to one another, then talking can proceed
with an appropriate usage of language (i.e. , amount of deference, respect, informality/ formality).
Conversation must be tailored to the nature of social relationships.
There are few languages that are as extensive as Japanese in delineating status distinction
and confirming role responsibilities (Kerbo, 1991; Suzuki, 1986). Individual's roles and statuses
are relatively fixed and social interactions bring about role confirmations.

One's 'sensei'

(teacher) from elementary school days remains 'sensei' no matter what status the pupil may
achieve thirty years later. When the pupil's mother sees her son's teacher on the street, she will
still call him 'senseL' The teacher is not her teacher, but her son's teacher, and the usage of
'sensei' indicates that her status is defined through her relation to her child. She does not exist
as a person per se, but is given a status defined by a web of social relations. Similarly, family
members call each other by status-relevant terms, such as 'oneesan' (elder sister), 'oniisan'
(elder brother), 'okasan' (mother), indicating one's own relationship to the addressee. An older
sister may call her younger brother by his first name, but the reverse is not proper; a mother
can call her son by his first name, but the son cannot address his mother by her first name.
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These distinctions mark status boundaries between superiors and inferiors.
In the Japanese language, one's self is embedded in social groups and constructed through
social interactions. Even though a newly married couple call each other 'anata' (you), 'omae'
(you), or by their first names, with the arrival of a child, they start calling each other 'otosan'
(father) and 'okasan' (mother). The wife is not his 'okasan' but she is 'okasan' from the point
of the child. When the wife talks to her child, she will call herself 'okasan', identifying herself
from the child's point of view.

Suzuki (1986) notes that within the family, this relational

terminology tends to harmonize with the position of the youngest child, signifying the childcentered, rather than couple-centered, family relations in Japan. In the Japanese family system,
the relationship between parent and child takes a higher order than that between husband and
wife. This partly explains why parenthood (especially, motherhood) carries considerable weight
in adult status attainment. Achieving parenthood is significant not just in terms of psychological
gratification but more in terms of achieving own self in society.

In the U.S., there is no ·

equivalent linguistic role confirmation, and 'Tom' and 'Jane' remain two individuals. Marriage
is a personal contract between two separate individuals, and this individualistic and personal
nature is reflected in the ceremonial exchanges of birthday gifts and the demonstrative usage of
terms like 'honey' and 'darling' to confirm their bonding (Suzuki, 1986: 154).
Outside the home, a Japanese person is linked to his/her neighborhood, school,
community, and company in a similar manner (e.g., 'sen-pai', 'ko-hai' at school and work).
Further, through social interaction, Japanese are socialized to be considerate of the needs of
others and expect reciprocity. Doi (1986) claims that Japanese are raised from birth to rely on
others rather than operate independently.

It is not simply dependence but rather
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interdependence, an elaborate interlocking system in which one looks to others to fulfill his/her
needs while they, in turn, look to him/her. The Japanese ritual of gift-giving signifies this
principle of social reciprocity. One gives a gift to perform the duties associated with his/her
status in one's group. Giri, the moral imperative to perform one's duties toward other members
of a group, evokes the obligation to reciprocate (Befu, 1986). It is in these reciprocal social
relationships that one's social characters are defined (i.e., the degree to which one meets
obligation defines one's character). When a person's self-identity and statuses do not depend
on the immediate groups, then, girl-based gift giving looses its meaning. Befu (1986) suggests
that with the more individualized life style, educated people in urban areas find girl-based giftgiving very constraining, nuisance, 'feudalistic', and an unpleasant obligation. They shift to
more pers6nalized gift-giving based on the already established relationship. In such gift-giving,
the principle of reciprocity does not exist. The act of gift-giving itself is the acknowledgement
of giver's social character.
In the U.S. the housewife/homemaker role and the status of motherhood have increasing!y
been stigmatized and become ambiguous. These changes force a woman to attain status through
her own work career. In contrast, the status of a Japanese mother is acknowledged through her
social interactions outside of the familial contexts. She does not need to demonstrate who she
is to others in order to be recognized. She is called 'okaasan' from her child's teacher, 'okusan'
(housewife) from shopkeepers in her neighborhood and from colleagues who works with her
husband. As in the case of gift-giving, failure to fulfill one's roles appropriately diminishes her
social character and leads to a loss of the face for the whole family.
In summary, in the U.S., men and women must compete for their status production.
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One's social status is assumed to be achieved, with rewards given to career based high-status
attainment. In Japan, men and women need not seek a similar status, but they need to fit into
a network society. Men and women fulfill different roles in these social networks. Rewards
of high-status attainment do not directly go to an individual, but are shared by the members of
the group involved. The wife of a teacher is treated with respect from her husband's pupils and
the pupil's parents. The community receives her as the wife of a teacher and expects her to
fulfill roles that are quite different from other wives. She may work full-time or part-time, and
her work orientation derives from her family needs rather than purely from her own needs.
When a middle-aged part-time worker says that she needs convenient work hours, it is the most
rational approach to fulfill her family duties as a mother and as a wage earner. The lack of
women's career orientation in Japan is not just caused by the perceived or actual obstacles in
education and employment, or by her false consciousness, but it is an outcome of defining her
economic roles in the familial context.
In the 1960s and 1970s when American professional baseball players joined teams in
Japan, they went to Japan with the belief that what matters most is individual performance.
Americans are accustomed to doing their best, and by so doing, to help the team. However,
they soon discovered that 'playing a game' in Japan meant quite different things, things that
seemed totally unrelated to baseball performance: being on time to the minute; going to
numerous meetings and practices; doing what others do; being status-conscious; and being
regimented, etc. Japanese players are trained to work toward the progress of the team. Each
person sacrificing his personal goals to the team objectives (e.g., instead of hitting a home run,
bunt).

American players complained that these Japanese rules and practices were too
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constraining, irrational, bizarre, and unfair. Japanese resented American players for not caring
to respect Japanese customs and concepts of order, established procedure, and "face" in playing
baseball (Whitig, 1977). The bitter exchange of remarks revealed that a seemingly clear-cut
activity, playing baseball, is not so simple, given differences in the institutional contexts of the
activity. The baseball story parallels difficulties of understanding gender equality in the two
countries.
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TABLE 1
PARTICIPATION IN THE LABOR FORCE
United States and Japan, 1960-1990

Year

Japan

U.S.
Male

Female

Male

Female

1960

84

38

85

55

1970

81

43

82

50

1980

75

52

80

48

1990

74

58

77

50

Source: Japanese Ministry of Labor (Rodo-sho) (1991). Fujin Rodo no Jitsujo (Conditions of
Female Labor). Appendix 1, p.5, Appendix 96, pp. 90-91. U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1991. No. 641, p. 390.
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TABLE 2
WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE BY MARITAL STATUS

Year

U.S.
Single

Japan
Married

Single

Married

1960

(100 %)
58.6

(100 %)
31.9

(100%)
63.6

(100%)
51.1

1970

56.8

40.5

59.3

48.3

1980

64.4

49.8

52.6

49.2

1990

68.0

57.8

55.2

52.7

Source: Japanese Ministry of Labor (Rodo-sho) (1991), Appendix 3, p.8; U.S. Bureau of the
Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1991. No. 642, p. 390.
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FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY AGE,
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FIGURE 2
FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY AGE,
JAPAN, 1960-1990
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TABLE 3
JAPANESE FEMALE WORKERS BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Women Working as:
· Employee
Year Full-time Part-time

Family
Worker* Employed

Self

Total

(%)

1955

33.6

50.6

15.8

100

1960

40.8

43.4

15.8

100

30.9

14.2

100

23.0

13.7

100

16.7

10.7

100

1970

48.3

5.0

35.9
1980

51.3

12.0

35.0
1990

52.6

19.7

36.4
Source: Japanese Ministry of Labor (Rodo-sho) (1991). Fujin Rodo no Jitsujo (Condition of
Female Labor). Appendix 6, p. 10, and Appendix 97, p. 92.
* Includes family enterprise workers and workers who perform work at home (e.g., piece rate
work).
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TABLE 4
EMPLOYMENT TYPE BY AGE AMONG WOMEN,
1982 AND 1987, JAPAN

Age

Employee

Part time/
Temporarya

Total

(%)
15-24
25-34
35-54
55 -

86.8
70.7
56.5
53.2

10.7
24.7
34.5
24.5

2.5
4.6
9.0
22.4

(%)

1987
15-24
25-34
35-54

55 -

100
100
100
100

81.6
70.4
50.5
47.5

22.1
26.3
43.3
35.2

1.6
3.2
6.1
17.2

100
100
100
100

Source: Rodo-sho (1990). Rodo Hakusho. Appendix 7, p. 351.
a: Includes regular part-time workers and temporary wage earners.
b: Includes all other forms of non-regular jobs, including self-employment and family business
partnership.
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Table 5
Conditions of Work as measured by the Average Hours Worked per worker per year, Average
Number of Holidays per year, Average Number of Paid-vacation per year, and Missed Work
Days per worker per year: Cross-National Comparisons, 1989 and 1991

Work Conditions
measured by:

Japan

U.K.

U.S.

France

Germany

Hours worked per
worker per year
1989
1991

2,159
2,080

1,989
1,902

1,957
1,943

1,646
1,662

1,638
1,582

Holidays per year
1989
1991

117
120

147
147

138
139

154
154

155
157

9

24

19

26

29

3

11

6

11

16

Paid-vacation days taken
per worker per year

1989-1991
Missed work days per
worker per year
1989

Source: Ministry of Labor (1991: 63) and (1993: 68).
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Table 6
Conditions of Work as measured by the Average Hours Worked per worker per month and
availability of Two-day Weekend Holidays in Japan, 1970-1989

Firm size

1970

1975

1980

1985

1989

Hours worked per worker per month

All firms

182 (hrs)

175

175

175

174

500+

185

163

176

177

178

30-99

192

175

183

184

182

5.4

6.4

14.5

Institution of two-day weekend holidays

4.6(%)

All firms

n.a.

1,000+

n.a.

28.5

30.6

35.5

63.0

30-99

n.a.

2.8

2.5

3.0

8.9

Source: Ministry of Labor (1992: 286-87) and (1993: 382). Based on the report by companies
employing 30 or more persons.
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Table 7
Women and the Preferred Life Course Patterns
by Age Group, 1972-1990, Japan

Survey
Year
N.A.

Work until
marriage or
birth of a
first child

Resume work
after children
are grown up

Continue
working while
raising child

7.8 (%)

30.9 (%)

39.5 (%)

11.5 (%)

m

1983

2.2

19.5

55.2

16.6

6.6

1990

1.9

14.2

64.2

14.4

53

Don't work

Overall Trend (1972-1990l
1972

(%)

By Age Group (Working Women only) (1991)b
16-19

0.0 (%)

28.2 (%)

50.4 (%)

20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54

0.1
0.0
0.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7

26.9
17.6
7.5
7.2
7.2
7.0
7.4

52.3
53.2
48.0
53.6
68.3
75.0
68.5

13.5
22.2
36.4
31.2
19.0
13.0
13.0

Total

0.2 (%)

19.6 (%)

54.9 (%)

18.0 (%)

9.9 (%)

115

(%)

7.1
7.0

75
8.0
5.6
5.0
7.4
7.4

(%)

Source: a--Prime Minister's Office (1990) A Survey of Women's Attitudes toward Work. b--The
Japan Institute of Labor (1992). A Survey of Employment Conditions and Career Attitudes
among Female Workers. Report No. 21., p. 55. N=3,072.
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Table 8
Major Reasons for .Choosing Part-time, as opposed to Full-time, Work
among Women, Japan 1991 (Multiple Answers)

. Total

Age groups (%)

Major Rc:asons for
choosing part-ti.me wcrk

20-24 25-29 30;,.34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+ Average

Convenient wodcing hours

59.7(%) 66.0'

67.l

66.5

67.1

63.5

61.9

57.2

59.7

60.2

64.2

Short v;orking hours/days

25.1

33.9

31.6

33.5

'39.2

36.6

35.8

33.5

37.7

27.0

35.0

Have family respoost'bilities

9.0

33.2

46.9

43.0

28.7

17.9

14.8

7.0

5.5

2.3

25.2

Interesting job

23.3

18.1

16.4

12.6

16.2

15.7

16.7

13.3

21.6

14.5

16.1

Couldn't find a full-time job

10.3

8.9

9.1

10.6

11.7

17.0

22.2

23.0

16.1'

17.3

14.4

Other major reasons

23.9

13.3

14.5,

12.6

12.9

13.3

12.0

. 16.7

12.1

20.8

13.9

E.:isyto quit

18.8

15.2

11.8

15.0

11.9

13.2

12.2

12.6

14.7

16.0

13.4

3.6.

6.3

. 10.2

10.2

13.0

13.8 .·

14.1

14.6

13.2

10.8

Have friends who work pa:rt~time
rather than full-time
7.0

I..ackingphysica.l stamina to work
a;. a full-time worker

5.2

5.3

4.1

5.2

92

11.7

15.0

15.5

16.9

25.2

9.9

Good pay.and benefits

9.8

8.3

9.5

8.8

9.3

9.3

10.3

9.4

13.5

5.4

9.4

Have elderly relatives
to care fer

0.9

0.6

0.8

1.5

2.7

3.2

3.2

4.5

2.8

- .- -

,-~-~ - -·

~

.

~

_., .. -·--

..

--

-~·

3.5
. --- . --

.

-~- ---~

A Committee to the Labor Minister on Employment Policies,
{1992) Conditions ·of Part-time Workers. pp. 122-123. N=30,000.

Source:

2.4
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Table 9
Work Career Orientation among Female Part-time Workers
Japan 1979 and 1991

Year

Question and Response

(%)
1979

"If you were given an opportunity to become a
full-time employee, would you like to switch to
a full-time position?"
Wish to switch to a full-time employee
position

17.4(%)
Do not wish to switch to a full-time
employee position

78.1(%)

Other/n.a.
4.5(%)

1991

"What type of employment would you like to get
in the-future?"
Would like to stay as a part-time worker

57.2(%)

Don't know
29.7(%)

Would like to do more challenging work
rather than assisting someone

6. 6( %)

Would like to receive educational or on
the job training so as to move onto
a professional or highly technical job

5.9(%)

Would like to move to a managerial job

O. 6( %)

Source: Ministry of Labor (1984). Conditions of Female Labor.
p. 60. Ministry of Labor (1992) Conditions of Part-time Labor
Force. p. 23.

